Q&A: The war in Ukraine
The ongoing Russian war in Ukraine has proven to be one of the most consequential and confusing political events of our time. Russia’s decision to invade was difficult to comprehend, particularly since it clashed with what most experts saw as its strategic objectives, but the widely assumed Russian victory has failed to materialize as Ukrainian fighters have turned back attacks from an infinitely superior force. Around the world, global powers have reacted in remarkable and even historically unprecedented ways. To understand what is happening in Ukraine and why it matters,Ěý University Communications' Phil Gloudemans spoke with Professor of the Practice in Political Science Paul T. Christensen, whose interests are Russian domestic politics, particularly social movements and civil society, and globalization and its implications for democracy.
Announcing Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine in 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that the invasion was intended to halt a “genocide” perpetrated by “the Kyiv regime,” and ultimately, to achieve “the demilitarization and de-Nazification of Ukraine,” allegations that were obviously and transparently false. Why did Russia invade Ukraine?
To be clear from the outset, the decision to invade Ukraine was taken by Putin and his inner circle; this was not a decision by Russia’s political elite in general, much less the people of Russia.Ěý The decision was driven by three factors: First, Putin and many Russian elites (and many ordinary Russians, to be fair) never accepted Ukraine’s independence as legitimate.Ěý For strategic and ideological reasons, they feel that Ukraine should be part of Russia.Ěý Secondly, Putin had domestic political reasons for invading Ukraine—namely, his fear of having a stable, prosperous, democratic neighbor whose people are Slavic next to his increasingly authoritarian and dysfunctional regime.Ěý The third reason involved strategic misperception and bad intelligence; in other words, hubris.Ěý Putin overestimated the effectiveness of the Russian military as a fighting force, underestimated Ukraine’s ability to defend its sovereignty, and misread the West’s willingness to support Ukraine militarily and politically.
The consensus pre-invasion assessment was that Russia would easily prevail in a conventional war. But that’s not how the war has played out at all; Ukraine’s defenses have held firmly, despite the ravages of time and severe casualties. How has Ukraine not fallen?
There really was no “consensus” that the war would be quick. Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine took many military and international relations specialists in Moscow by surprise because they had previously predicted exactly what would happen if Russia tried.
I am not a military specialist, but several factors seem to be at play here. First, despite a major “reform” program in the Russian military under Putin, major organizational and technical problems affected the Russian armed forces.Ěý In addition, corruption was a serious issue in the Russian military, as it was (and is) in all parts of the Russian state apparatus.
Secondly, there are basic issues of morale here. Ukrainians are defending their homeland, while Russian troops are tasked with invading a country that has never posed a threat to them.Ěý The fact that Russia has been forced to rely on prisoners released from Russian jails and soldiers from North Korea tells us something about why Ukraine has managed to hold on. And let’s not forget the importance of European and American military support.
Paul T. Christensen (Caitlin Cunningham)
Given Putin’s increasingly repressive policies during the Ukraine conflict, including silencing independent media outlets and blocking access to social media, do we have any idea what Russians think about the war?
Getting accurate information on public opinion in Russia is difficult, whether concerning the war in Ukraine or other important political, social, or cultural issues. However, there is still one public opinion organization in Russia, the Levada Center, that provides us with some trustworthy insights into what ordinary Russians are thinking.Ěý While the majority of Russians still support Putin and the army, upwards of 60 percent of those polled describe the political situation in Russia as “tense” or “critical,” and of those, over half cite the “special military operation” as the reason why.
NATO’s announcement in 2008 that former Soviet republics Georgia and Ukraine would become members at an unspecified future date surely infuriated the Russians, who considered NATO expansion as a direct threat to their security. Some experts have claimed it was one of the critical reasons for Putin’s decision to attack Ukraine; others strongly disagree, noting that Ukraine’s membership was already off the table before the invasion and that Russia’s war aims went far beyond simply blocking Ukraine’s NATO bid. What’s your take?
Putin and many other Russian political elites have long been furious about NATO and European Union enlargement, particularly when it involves former Soviet states, but the issue of Ukraine’s potential membership in NATO has been on the table for many years.Ěý As noted earlier, the issue of NATO was just one aspect of Ukraine’s increasingly Western orientation and democratization, which the increasingly dictatorial Putin could not accept.Ěý Since Ukraine’s membership was not imminent, it is difficult to see how the timing of the invasion can be attributed to NATO.
One very thorny issue is the status of Crimea and the two breakaway Russian-supported republics in eastern Ukraine. The Russians want Ukrainian recognition of its annexation of Crimea and the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; Ukraine claims all three as its territory. Is compromise possible? If they do somehow arrive at an agreement, will it hold?
Anything is possible. I can see a scenario in which Ukraine accepts a long-term cease fire at the existing lines of control, but I can’t see any Ukrainian leader accepting Russia’s annexation of Crimea or the independence of Donetsk or Luhansk.Ěý That said, make no mistake: Any “compromise” will not hold, because Putin’s war aims of destroying Ukraine’s independent statehood have not changed and will not change.Ěý Anyone who thinks Putin will honor any agreement is either astonishingly naĂŻve or in denial.
American policy during most of the conflict has been exceptionally clear: Support the Ukrainians with massive amounts of military assistance while exerting pressure on Putin to withdraw by implementing a range of international economic sanctions. Overall, the United States has been extremely willing to take aggressive steps to punish Moscow and aid Kyiv’s war effort. How has this changed since President Trump has been in office?
Aside from behaving like a schoolyard bully when meeting [Ukraine President] Zelensky, it’s not clear what Trump really has in mind for Ukraine.Ěý First, he freezes weapons deliveries; then he reinstates them. Then he puts pressure on Ukraine over mineral rights, power plants, and on it goes.Ěý At this point, all I can say is that right or wrong, the Biden administration was a reliable partner of Ukraine; the Trump administration—in Ukraine and elsewhere—is not.
Trump will likely be confronted soon with a difficult decision: He can begin pushing back on Russia—something he’s appeared reluctant to do so far—or he can make progressively consequential concessions to Putin to meet a reported self-imposed deadline of April 20 to end the combat. Zelensky claimed that Russia is capitalizing on Trump’s desire to deliver a ceasefire as an opportunity to insert its demands into agreements that were ostensibly unconditional. Which way do you think Trump will go?Ěý How will this end?
The honest answer is that I do not know how this will end.Ěý Given Trump’s personal affinity for Putin and other authoritarian leaders, his evident dislike of Zelensky, and his equally clear belief—completely unwarranted in my view—that he is a master dealmaker, I think there is a very good chance that Trump will sell Ukraine “down the Dnieper,” as it were.Ěý That said, even if there is a ceasefire, it will only be a temporary hiatus in what will remain Putin’s long-term strategic plan to change the international order and undermine the West.Ěý We should perhaps not be surprised: After all, apart from a few relatively brief historical moments, this has been Russia’s “grand strategy” since at least Catherine the Great.
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