Nearly one year to the day that Russia invaded Ukraine, and on the heels of President Biden鈥檚 surprise visit to Kyiv, an interdisciplinary panel of Boston College faculty met at Fulton Hall on February 23 to share their historical, geopolitical, cultural, and religious perspectives on the conflict, frequently characterized as a vicious war of attrition.
The occasion was one that went beyond purely academic analysis, as reflected in a comment from panel organizer Professor of Russian, English, and Jewish Studies Maxim D. Shrayer: 鈥淭hree of my grandparents were born and raised in Ukrainian lands, and I feel not only an intellectual and professional connection but also a strong personal link to the suffering of Ukraine and her people.鈥
In addition to Shrayer, panelists included Associate Professor of History Nicole Eaton; Professor Gerald M. Easter, chair of the Political Science Department; and Professor of History Devin O. Pendas. Curt Woolhiser, a lecturer in Russian and Slavic Studies, provided an overview of the war鈥檚 history and served as moderator, while Professor of Near Eastern Studies Franck Salameh, chair of the Department of Eastern, Slavic, and German Studies, delivered the introduction.
Easter discussed the geopolitical implications of the Ukraine war, with neither side seeming ready to negotiate as the battle began its second year. 鈥淚t鈥檚 a multi-dimensional conflict. At one level, it is a fight over Ukrainian nationhood: How is the nation defined, who is in, and who is out. When Russia intervened a year ago, civil war was already underway.鈥
Another key factor, he said, is Russia鈥檚 ambition to be a regional hegemon and maintain influence over non-Russian peoples on its periphery鈥攍ong part of a Russian-dominated empire, but now independent鈥攁nd its aversion to NATO鈥檚 military buildup on its borders.
Yet another dimension is 鈥渢he proxy war,鈥 said Easter: 鈥淯kraine may be the battlefield, but the fight is between Russia and the United States.鈥 The Biden administration and U.S. security establishment 鈥渟ee Russia as a 鈥榩eer competitor,鈥 whom they seek to weaken economically and militarily, and to effect regime change. Russia would have won the war last summer were it not for U.S. and NATO intervention on Ukraine鈥檚 behalf.鈥
Although media coverage often strikes an optimistic tone, Easter said, the fact is Ukraine is losing the war, and desperately needs more weapons from the West鈥攁lthough such aid won鈥檛 bring things back to the way they were.
鈥淯kraine has already lost one-fifth of its territory and population; its economy and infrastructure are in shambles. Sadly, neither side is backing down. Ukraine鈥檚 hopes lie in conflict expansion by drawing in more parties. The risk of escalation into a wider regional war or worse is considerably higher today than it was a year ago when the conflict began.鈥
Pendas described Russia鈥檚 war as 鈥渃omprehensively criminal [and] a clear violation of international law.鈥 The UN charter forbids state-on-state military force except in self-defense or when authorized by the UN Security Council, neither of which is the case, and Russia鈥檚 annexation of Ukrainian territory is also illegal.
Russia鈥檚 targeting of civilian infrastructure is a particularly serious violation of the laws of war, he added, and it鈥檚 possible that鈥攊n addition to war crimes and large-scale crimes against humanity鈥擱ussia has committed acts of genocide by targeting Ukrainian children for kidnapping and deportation to Russia.
But it鈥檚 highly unlikely that more than a small number of low-level perpetrators will ever face criminal trial for their actions, Pendas added, even though Ukraine accepted International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction and the ICC has been investigating since last March.
鈥淧ast experience suggests that the ICC will struggle to secure evidence held by the Russians or to arrest Russian defendants not already in Ukrainian custody. Vladimir Putin will almost surely evade international prosecution.鈥
Panelists also provided historical and cultural perspectives on the conflict. Eaton explained how Russia repeatedly exploits antiquity to justify its aggressive war in Ukraine. Both countries draw on ancient and recent history as an act of national identity formation, and both appeal to the same inheritances as the foundations for their modern nations, but in ultimately different ways.
鈥淎fter the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia is dealing with a nationwide identity crisis as it seeks to create a positive Russian domestic character in the post-colonial period after the loss of its imperial territories,鈥 she said. 鈥淒enying sovereignty and nationhood to Ukraine, paradoxically, is part of Putin鈥檚 goal to form a new Russian identity.鈥 听
Eaton described three historical myths Russia has used in legitimizing its aggression: modern Ukraine was created by Vladimir Lenin, first head of the Soviet Union; Russia is merely reclaiming 鈥渉istoric Russian lands鈥; and Russia鈥檚 mission is to 鈥渄enazify鈥 Ukraine. 鈥淓ach of these is fundamental to Russia鈥檚 own sense of identity, but each is ultimately a gross simplification and ignores Ukrainian state sovereignty and national self-determination.鈥
Shrayer focused on Ukraine as a multiethnic and multireligious country, and on the role of religious leaders and Ukraine鈥檚 minorities during the war. He noted that Ukraine is home to about 38 million ethnic Ukrainians and more than eight million ethnic Russians, but also to Moldovans, Poles, Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Jews, Greeks, and other minorities. More than 70 percent of Ukrainian citizens are Orthodox Christians and approximately nine percent of the population is Ukrainian Greek Catholic or Roman Catholic, while smaller but vibrant communities of Jews and Muslims also live there.
鈥淎ll of Ukraine鈥檚 ethnic and religious communities have banded together to defend their country,鈥 Shrayer concluded. 鈥淎s we fervently pray for Ukraine鈥檚 full victory, we also worry about the prospects of survival for Ukraine鈥檚 smaller ethnic and religious communities.鈥
The panel was sponsored by the Office of the Dean of Morrissey College of Arts and Sciences; BC鈥檚 departments of History, Political Science, and Eastern, Slavic, and German Studies; and the Jewish Studies Program.
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Phil Gloudemans | University Communications | March 2023